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EXPEDITED REVIEW OF CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION
CLAIMS: IDAHO'S FLAWED PROCESS
Joan M. Fisher*
While some states are imposing moratoriums on executions'
and even entertaining abolition of the death penalty2 due to
recently-discovered prosecutorial misconduct and death sentences
imposed on innocent people, other states are searching for ways to
expedite the process. For example, Florida Governor Jeb Bush has
called on legislators to adopt a "unitary review" 3 system of appeal
in capital cases which is designed to shorten the time between
conviction and execution of sentence.4 A unitary system
* Supervising Attorney, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal Defenders of Eastern
Washington and Idaho.
1. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Illinois Study of Death Row Errors Turns to "Inadequate"
Defense, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZE'rE, Feb. 6, 2000, at A6 (discussing Illinois Governor
George Ryan's "moratorium on executions" following the release of a thirteenth inmate from
death row determined to have been improperly convicted and sentenced to death). Governor
Ryan's announced moratorium has apparently influenced calls for reexamination of the death
penalty in other states. For example, Kansas Governor Bill Graves called for re-evaluation of
that state's capital process on February 17, 2000. Death Penalty Information Center, What's
New (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http:www.essential.org/dpic/whatsnew.html>. The Catholic
Archbishop of Philadelphia called for a moratorium on executions in Pennsylvania, supported
by the Philadelphia City Council. Id. The Charlottesville, Virginia, City Council called for a
moratorium on executions in Virginia in a January 18, 2000 resolution. Id Similarly, the House
of Delegates of the Louisiana State Bar Association called for a moratorium on Louisiana
legislation by a vote of two to one on January 21, 2000, based on concern that death row
inmates have appropriate means to present their claims to the courts for review before
execution. Id.
2. A bill has been introduced in the New Hampshire state legislature to abolish the state's
death penalty supported by a former state representative whose father was murdered and who
now leads a victims' support group which argues that capital punishment perpetuates a cycle of
violence. Death Penalty Information Center, What's New (visited Mar. 1, 2000)
<http:www.essential.org/dpic/whatsnew.html>. A Vermont state senator who previously
sponsored and supported death penalty legislation has now reversed his position based upon
concerns about mistakes made in the criminal justice system. Id
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (West Supp. 1999).
4. Governor Bush threatened to block a special session to change the manner of
executions from lethal injection unless the legislature considers proposed amendments to
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essentially consolidates the direct appeal and state post-conviction
process to eliminate the additional time involved in consideration
of collateral attacks typically brought after the direct appeal has
been resolved.
Adoption of unitary systems by states has been encouraged
with Congress's passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("the Act" or "AEDPA"), signed into law by
President Clinton on April 26, 1996. An important impetus for
passage of this legislation is the federal effort to expedite litigation
in capital cases. Chapter 154 of the Act invites states to avail
themselves6 of expedited federal review of constitutional claims
raised by state inmates in capital cases by adopting postconviction measures that provide for competent and adequately
compensated counsel.7
shorten the appeals process. Governor Bush's top policy adviser, Brad Thomas, was quoted
as describing the goals of the expedited process: "What I hope is that we become more like
Texas. Bring in the witnesses, put them on a gurney, and let's rock and roll." Death Penalty
Information Center, What's New (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http:www.essential.org/dpic/
whatsnew.html>.
5. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255;
inserting new section codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266 (West Supp. 1999)).
6. See, e.g., ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5(a), which expressly provides: "The intent of this
rule is to comply with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2261 et seq."
7. Section 2261 provides:
(a) This chapter shall apply to cases arising under section 2254 brought by
prisoners in State custody who are subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply
only if the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied.
(b) This chapter is applicable if a State established by statute, rule of its court of
last resort, or by another agency authorized by State law, a mechanism for the
appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of
competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent
prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct
appeal to the court of last resort in the State or have otherwise become final for
State law purposes. The rule of court or statute must provide standards for
competency for the appointment of such counsel.
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and reimbursement of
counsel as provided in subsection (b) must offer counsel to all State prisoners
under capital sentence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of
record(1) appointing one or more counsels to represent the prisoner upon a
finding that the prisoner is indigent and accepted the offer or is unable to
competently decide whether to accept or reject the offer;
(2) finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the prisoner rejected the offer
of counsel and made the decision with an understanding of its legal
consequences; or
(3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a finding that the prisoner is

EXPEDITED REVIEW OF CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION CLAIMS

In the wake of public and judicial criticism of the length of
time often involved in litigation that may delay execution of
capital sentences,8 some states have adopted unitary systems for
expediting state post-trial process designed to reduce the overall
time period for disposition of capital cases. Because capital cases
typically offer significant potential for post-conviction challenges,
particularly with regard to allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the unitary system expedites the review process by
triggering post-conviction process prior to resolution of the direct
appeal. Although the unitary system theoretically does, and in
practice actually may, expedite state appellate review, the
problems associated with development of ineffective assistance
and newly-discovered evidence claims raise ethical, legal, and
moral questions regarding the sufficiency of the review afforded.
Idaho has had an expedited and consolidated appeal process
in capital cases since 1984. Consideration of the Idaho experience,
as well as the experience of other jurisdictions adopting unitary
systems, reveals that if a unitary system successfully expedites the
process, a proposition subject to some doubt, it does so at the
expense of the careful review purportedly demanded in death
penalty cases. 9 Fifteen years after Idaho's adoption of the
consolidated, or unitary, process for review of capital cases,
operation of this system suggests serious due process concerns,
some of which are inherent in the approach, others undoubtedly
idiosyncratic to Idaho.
This article focuses on the operation of expedited capital
post-conviction review procedure in Idaho and addresses issues
that may be common to other state systems of consolidated
appellate and post-conviction review process in capital cases.
While pre-AEDPA adoption of consolidated review may have
reflected a political response to age-old criticism of delay
not indigent.
8. For example, former Chief Justice Burger criticized the delay involved in capital cases,
observing that the argument that the death penalty involves "cruel and unusual punishment is
dwarfed by the cruelty of 10 years on death row inflicted on this guilty defendant by lawyers
seeking to turn the administration of justice into a sporting contest." Sullivan v. Wainwright,
464 U.S. 109, 112 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in per curiam order denying stay of
execution); see also Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 322 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(encouraging prosecutors to challenge stays of execution ordered on abusive writ applications);
Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (criticizing "11th
hour" petitions).
9. See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
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between imposition of sentence and execution, states recently
adopting or considering expedited procedures are undoubtedly
influenced by the promise of expedited federal post-conviction
review afforded by passage of the AEDPA in 1996. Despite the
inclination of states to adopt expedited process for review, it is
not clear that the statutes effect their purpose, or, more
importantly, comport with constitutional concerns for
heightened scrutiny in capital cases.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF POST-CONVICTION REVIEW IN GENERAL

Post-conviction remedies available in state court systems
include diverse statutory and common law processes, such as writs
of habeas corpus,' ° writs of coram nobis," writs of error, motions
for new trial and out-of-time motions for new trial, 3 motions or
petitions for reduction of sentence,' 4 remittitur,"5 or statutory post-

10. Tennessee, for example, recognizes the continuing validity of the common law habeas
corpus remedy in addition to the statutory remedy, which includes a three-year statute of
limitations. See Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 61-62 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-30-102 does not provide exclusive remedy for challenging conviction in light of
state constitutional provision, TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (which provides that the "writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended") and pointing out that "the two avenues of collateral
attack are theoretically and statutorily distinct").
11. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954); Penn v. State, 670
S.W.2d 426 (Ark. 1984).
12. Alabama continues to recognize the writ of error by statute, see ALA. CODE § 12-22220 (1995), although the traditional writ of coram nobis has now been abolished by court rule,
see ALA. R. CIv. P. 60(b). Review by writ of error applies to review of those errors apparent on
the face of the record. See Exparte Salter, 520 So. 2d 213, 215-16 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
13. The out-of-time motion for new trial is recognized as a post-conviction remedy in
Texas for certain errors that arguably are not subject to review by writ of habeas corpus.
See Tuffiash v. State, 878 S.W.2d 197, 199-200 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (permitting filing of
out-of-time motion for new trial where newly discovered evidence demonstrated likelihood
that testimony of forensic serologist was false, but not necessarily attributable to prosecutor
under Texas law for purposes of misconduct claim).
14. A Missouri defendant may petition the trial court of conviction for reduction of a
sentence not subject to statutory exclusion. MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.046 (West 1999); see, e.g.,
State v. Stout, 960 S.W.2d 535, 536-37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction
to review trial court's denial on motion to reduce sentence).
15. New York procedure recognizes remittitur ordered by appellate court in returning
case to jurisdiction of the trial court to determine claim on the merits. See People v. Owens,
450 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1982) (case returned to trial court for determination of
defendant's claim that prior felony conviction was obtained in violation of constitutional
rights).
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conviction remedies." Although post-conviction process may
technically be construed to include any proceedings following
judgment of conviction, such as conventional motions for new
trial filed and disposed of prior to the direct appeal, the term is also
used generically to include all forms of collateral attack not
encompassed by the direct appeal. 7
The review process for capital cases typically includes the
direct appeal, mandatory in most jurisdictions, 8 and postconviction review following affirmance of the conviction or
sentence or both on direct appeal in state and federal courts. A
majority of the thirty-eight states which authorize the death
penalty rely on a direct appeals process that includes an automatic
sentence review by the state court of last resort 9 and direct
appellate review of trial and sentencing error, followed by a state
habeas corpus or post-conviction process. 0 At the conclusion of
state proceedings, an inmate usually raises claims of federal
constitutional violations through petition for writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court followed by a petition for federal
habeas corpus relief in a United States district court. A majority of
death-penalty jurisdictions do not have any special rules to give
these cases priority over other appeals,2 although in some
16. E.g., TEX. CODE CRtM. P. ANN. art. 11.07,

§ 1 (West

Supp. 2000), providing: "This

article establishes the procedures for an application for writ of habeas corpus in which the
applicant seeks relief from a felony judgment imposing a penalty other than death."
17. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6.1, at 253 (3d ed. LEXIS Law Publ'g 1998).
18. In Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) and Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149

(1990) the Supreme Court rejected attempts by "next friends," litigating on behalf of death
row inmates facing execution to force state courts to engage in appellate review despite the
knowing and intelligent waivers of appeal entered by the inmates. The Arkansas Supreme
Court has recently concluded that appellate review of death sentences will be mandatorily
undertaken, despite the Supreme Court's approval of waivers of appeal in Whitmore. State
v. Robbins, 5 S.W.3d 51, 55 (Ark. 1999).
19. For example, article 37.071, § 2(h) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

provides that in capital cases, "[t]he judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be
subject to automatic review by the Court of Criminal Appeals." See also Guidry v. State, 9
S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ("Direct appeal to this Court is automatic.").

20. Only California, Colorado, Idaho, and Texas have post-conviction activities before
final adjudication on direct appeal. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.6 (West Supp. 1999);
CAL. S. CT. POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENTS OF DEATH, Policy 3,
Standards Governing Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions; CAL. APP. R. 76.6; COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 16-12-201 to -210 (1999); COLO. R. CRtM. P. 32.2; IDAHO CODE § 19-2719
(1997); TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 11.071 (West Supp. 2000).
21. Although the Supreme Court has declined to hold that post-trial proceedings must

90
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jurisdictions, capital cases are heard directly by the highest court,22

rather than first being addressed by intermediate courts of
appeals.23
II. IDAHO'S CONSOLIDATED APPEAL AND EXPEDITED
POST-CONVICTION PROCESS

A. Evolution of Idaho Post-ConvictionProcess
1.

The Statutory Scheme

Until 1984, post-conviction remedies in Idaho's capital and
non-capital cases were governed by the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act ("UPCPA"). The UPCPA contains two issue
preclusion sections: Section 19-4901(b) bars litigation of any issue
in post-conviction that could have been raised on direct appeal; 4
section 19-4908 imposes a procedural bar to litigation of claims
have different standards for death penalty cases, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, and
Oklahoma all now apply different post-conviction relief rules in death penalty cases. See,
e.g., ARIZ. R. GRIM. P. 32.4; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850, 3.851; IDAHO CODE § 19-2719
(1997); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 930.8 (West Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 1089 (West Supp. 2000).
22. See, e.g., ARK. R. SUP. CT. & CT. APP. 1-2(a) which provides, in pertinent part:
All cases appealed shall be filed in the Court of Appeals except that the
following cases shall be filed in the Supreme Court: ...
2. Criminal appeals in which the death penalty or life imprisonment has
been imposed.
23. For instance, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, an intermediate appellate court,
reviews death penalty cases before they are eligible for review on petition for writ of certiorari
in the Alabama Supreme Court. See, e.g., Tarver v. State, 500 So. 2d 1232 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986), arId,500 So. 2d 1256 (Ala. 1986).
24. Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) (1997) provides:
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction.
Any issue that could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited
and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to
the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence,
have been presented earlier. Except as otherwise provided in this act, it
comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other
remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or
sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.
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based on a petitioner's "knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver." 25 The UCPCA also imposes a one-year statute of
limitations for filing post-conviction actions.26
In 1984, Idaho enacted a new statute establishing special
proceedings in capital cases, a "[s]pecial appellate and postconviction procedure for capital cases" which expressly "shall be
interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary
delay in carrying out a valid death sentence." 27 In furtherance of
that purpose, subsection (3) of the statute provides that "[a]
defendant must file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence
of conviction that is known or reasonably should be known"
within forty-two days of the filing of the judgment.28 Failure to
seek relief "within the time limits specified" is deemed a waiver
of "such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should
have been known." 29 After expiration of the 42-day period, Idaho
courts have no authority to consider any claims for relief that have
been waived or grant any relief. The Idaho Supreme Court has
described section 19-2719 as affording a death-sentenced
to raise all challenges to the
defendant "one opportunity
30
conviction and sentence."
2. Implementation of Section 19-2719's Expedited Processfor
CapitalCases
Review of Idaho decisions regarding enforcement of the
procedural limitations included in section 19-2719 demonstrates
the lack of a consistent or regular application of these
legislatively-imposed limitations to warrant recognition of an
acceptable theory of procedural default. Significantly, these
provisions apply only to the post-conviction process for capital
cases. This fact may explain why the Idaho Supreme Court has
failed to adopt a coherent approach to the restriction on capital
post-conviction litigation contemplated by section 19-2719.

25. See IDAHO CODE § 19-4908 (1997).
26. See IDAHO CODE § 19-4902 (1997) (amended in 1996, the statute previously imposed a
five-year statute of limitations).
27. IDAHOCODE § 19-2719 (1997).

28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Paz v. State, 852 P.2d 1355, 1356 (Idaho 1993).
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For example, prior to enactment of section 19-2719, the state
supreme court consistently recognized that while the postconviction statute permitted only one petition for relief, a second
petition would be allowed if the petitioner had been prevented
from raising claims in his first petition because of ineffective
assistance of appellate or prior post-conviction counsel.3 In
Palmerv. Dermitt,the court carefully emphasized the federal basis
supporting its "waiver" decision, distinguishing it from that of
other jurisdictions whose default rules emphasized procedural
necessity to assure finality of judgment. 2 The court thus
distinguished between adoption of a waiver rule, which
emphasizes the importance of a knowing and intelligent decision
to relinquish a right that bars further consideration of the claim on
the merits, from concern for finality, in which the state's interest in
concluding litigation results in a rule of default being applied
without consideration of the merits of the claim. Relinquishment
thus implies a constitutionally-based rejection of a claim, while
forfeiture based on procedural default merely implicates state law
grounds for rejection.
Interestingly, the Idaho court's view in Palmer, which
recognized that ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel would
serve to excuse default such that a defaulted claim would be

31. See Palmer v. Dermitt, 635 P.2d 955 (Idaho 1981).
32. Id. at 957-58. The court differentiated between the voluntary relinquishment of a right
and its loss through a procedural error in failing to preserve the right:
Essential to the difference between these two types of waiver is that one, the
finality rule, is an attribute of the procedural law of judgments, while the other,
the voluntary relinquishment rule, is a corollary of the law creating the
underlying right. The distinction between these is clearly visible when a federal
constitutional right is considered in the context of a state post-conviction
proceeding: what constitutes a waiver-voluntary-relinquishment is a question of
federal constitutional law; the question of the scope of a prior judgment is a
question of state procedural law. If the state court denies relief on the grounds
that the applicant intelligently and understandingly waived the right in question,
it has rendered a decision on a question of federal constitutional law. On the
other hand, if the state court denies relief on the ground that the applicant should
have raised the question at some earlier proceeding, it has rendered a decision on
a question purely of state law. Where it is found that an applicant has
relinquished a right, the decision is tantamount to holding that the right was
never violated. The decision, thus, is directly on the merits. Where the
foreclosure by judgment rule is applied, the court refuses to reach the merits of
the asserted denial of the constitutional right.
Id. at 958-59 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POST-CONVICTION
REMEDIES, § 6.1 commentary).
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addressed in a subsequent proceeding, proved to be more
charitable than the construction given by the United States
Supreme Court. In 1991 in Coleman v. Thompson,33 the Court
ruled that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance
of counsel does not extend to post-conviction proceedings.
Consequently, as a matter of federal constitutional law,
ineffectiveness rendered in a prior post-conviction proceeding will
not excuse procedural default.
While section 19-2719 provides that a defendant must
assert claims that "were known or reasonably should be
known," that language is the starting point of the waiver issue,
not its end. The critical question, one that remains unanswered,
is how the courts determine whether a petitioner knew or should
have known of a claim. Because the statute does not specify the
types of claims covered under its broad language, including
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, judicial interpretation
was required.
In State v. Aragon,34 following affirmance on direct appeal,
the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted the then-new capital postconviction procedure, issuing a Remittitur and Order granting the
defendant a 42-day delay before issuance of the death warrant so
the defendant could file a post-conviction petition pursuant to
section 19-2719. " The court's order presumed that the new statute
would apply to the disposition of Aragon's claims, even though
the conviction occurred well before enactment of section 192719.36 It did not interpret the language of the statute. Despite
finding that the new provisions would apply, the court ultimately
failed to follow its own order in disposing of those claims.
Following the court's announcement in Aragon I that section
19-2719 would apply to petitions challenging convictions obtained
prior to enactment of the new post-conviction statute, and despite
the legislative mandate that the new procedures control all capital
post-conviction proceedings, the court did not apply the statute

33. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
34. State v. Aragon, 690 P.2d 293 (Idaho 1984) ("Aragon F').
35. Id. at 317. The court issued a Remittitur and Order on November 26, 1984, which
ordered that there be a 42-day delay before the issuance of the death warrant to enable the
defendant to file a post-conviction petition pursuant to section 19-2719. The court ordered
that all further proceedings would be held under the new procedures enacted in 1984. Id.
36. 690 P.2d at 317.
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consistently to then-pending capital cases. 7 Its discretionary
approach therefore effectively abrogated whatever notice the
statute might have been said to give.
The first challenge to the new statute arose in the context of
an appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial and postconviction proceeding in its second review of claims raised in
State v. Beam. 8 There, the issues were found to be barred, not by
section 19-2719, but by the doctrine of res judicata incorporated in
section 19-4901(a)(1).39 Beam raised no substantive issues that
were not defaulted under that provision, other than the
constitutionality of section 19-2719 itself. The state supreme court
addressed the merits of this claim.4 °
Two months after rejecting the constitutional challenge in
Beam II, the Idaho Supreme Court decided the appeal of Aragon's
post-conviction petition in Aragon II, ' but made no mention of
section 19-2719. Instead, it affirmed the trial court's denial of
Aragon's petition based on section 19-4901.4' Notwithstanding the
legislative mandate included in sections 19-2719(5)41 and 192719(11)", the court expressly noted the availability of further
post-conviction proceedings upon the discovery of new evidence
or change in law under section 19-4901 .
4

37. See, e.g., State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252 (Idaho 1989); State v. Windsor, 716 P.2d 1182
(Idaho 1985); State v. Scroggins, 716 P.2d 1152 (Idaho 1985); State v. Stuart, 715 P.2d 833
(Idaho 1985) ("Stuart "); State v. Beam, 710 P.2d 526 (Idaho 1985); State v. Fetterly, 710

P.2d 1202 (Idaho 1985).
38. 766 P.2d 678 (Idaho 1988) ("Beam I").
39. Id. at 680, 684.
40. Id. at 680-81.
41. Aragon v. State, 760 P.2d 1174 (Idaho 1988) ("Aragon 11").
42. Id. at 1182.
43. Idaho Code § 19-2719(5) provides, in pertinent part:
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the
time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as

were known, or reasonably should have been known. The courts of Idaho shall
have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or

grant any such relief.
44. Idaho Code § 19-2719(11) (1997) provides, in pertinent part:

Any successive petition for post-conviction relief not within the exception of
subsection (5) of this section shall be dismissed summarily. Notwithstanding any

other statute or rule, the order of dismissal shall not be subject to any motion to
alter, amend or reconsider. Such order shall not be subject to any requirement for
the giving of notice of the court's intent to dismiss. The order of dismissal shall
not be appealable.
45. Aragon, 760 P.2d at 1182 n.12.
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The appellate and post-conviction saga of another capital
defendant, Gene Stuart, bears on the validity of state procedural
bar based upon section 19-2719.4' Never-in seventeen years and
four post-conviction hearings in the state courts-has the Idaho
Supreme Court invoked section 19-2719 to apply the doctrine of
procedural default to Stuart's claims, despite the State's argument,
in response to his rehearing motion from the affirmance of his
direct appeal in Stuart I, that the court should recognize a strict
application of procedural default principles. 47 The argument did
not persuade the court.48
In June 1986, following the court's disposition of his direct
appeal, Stuart filed his first state post-conviction petition more
than four months following issuance of the opinion on rehearing in
the direct appeal.49 In deciding Stuart II, the court applied only
section 19-4901 and did not mention section 19-2719.50
In 1990, the court decided Stuart 111.51 The court found
"true" allegations in the pleadings that the facts giving rise to a
second petition were only "recently discovered" and were thus
"unknown" at the time of the first petition." The court did not
find that these claims were barred under section 19-2719, long
after its adoption. However, while there was no direct discussion
of section 19-2719, the court used the exact language of the
statute's waiver provision: "Any grounds for relief not raised are
permanently waived if the grounds were known or should have
been known at the time of the first petition."53 Under this doctrine,
the court then concluded that "there is no absolute prohibition
against successive petitions for relief." 54
As late as 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court continued to apply
Palmerto capital cases and to equate the standards imposed under
sections 19-4908 and 19-2719 governing availability of postconviction relief in capital cases. Under any circumstance, the

46.
47.
48.
49.

715 P.2d 833 (Idaho 1985) ("Stuart1").
See State v. Stuart, 715 P.2d 833 (Idaho 1985) (Bistline, J., dissenting).
Id.
Stuart v. State, 801 P.2d 1216 (Idaho 1990) ("Stuart in').

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1218.
Stuart v. State, 801 P.2d 1283 (Idaho 1990) ("Stuartlll').
Id. at 1284.
See id.
See id. at 1285 (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 635 P.2d 955 (Idaho 1981)).
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Stuart cases stand for the principle that section 19-2719 has not
been consistently applied in a fashion rendering it an acceptable
basis for procedural default sufficient to preclude federal habeas
review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The state
court's later attempt to distinguish Stuart III as having been
decided under prior law ignores the definition of the waiver
requirement adopted by the court in Stuart III itself.
It was not until November 1991 that the Idaho Supreme
Court first hinted that a different rule would be applied to capital
5 a direct appeal which did not raise a
cases. In State v. Rhoades,"
claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the court, in dicta, stated that a
claim of ineffectiveness is "one of those claims that should
reasonably be known immediately upon the completion of the
trial, and one that can be raised in a [timely filed] post-conviction
proceeding." 56 This view of ineffectiveness claims stood in sharp
contrast to the great weight of authority nationally, and it sharply
diverged from Idaho's own precedent in Palmer.
The Rhoades court cited six cases from other state courts that
ostensibly supported its proposition.57 An examination of those
cases, however, shows that they simply do not support the
proposition that ineffective assistance claims are the kind that
should be known immediately after trial and within the 42-day
time limit of section 19-2719. In fact, one of those cases, Sims v.
State, was earlier cited in Palmer for precisely the opposite
proposition, permitting a second post-conviction petition when
counsel on a prior appeal or post-conviction motion had been
ineffective.58
Shortly after deciding Rhoades, the state supreme court
decided Fetterly v. State,59 considering whether a decision
rendered subsequent to Fetterly's appeal would be applied
retroactively. 6° In his successive post-conviction petition, Fetterly
55. '820 P.2d 665 (Idaho 1991).
56. See id. (dictum) (citing In re Cordero, 756 P.2d 1370 (Cal. 1988) (habeas corpus);
People v. Bean, 760 P.2d 996 (Cal. 1988) (habeas corpus); Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803
(Utah 1988); Daniels v. State, 688 P.2d 315 (Nev. 1984); Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 420
(Iowa 1980); Commonwealth v. Russell, 383 A.2d 866 (Pa. 1978)).
57. Id.
58. See Palmer v. Dermitt, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (Idaho 1981) (citing Sims v. State, 295
N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1980)).
59. 825 P.2d 1073 (Idaho 1991).
60. Id. at 1073.
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alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on
direct appeal, or in Fetterly's first state post-conviction
proceeding, a claim that would indisputably have resulted in
relief.6' The court reached the merits of the issue by holding that
the change in the law was not subject to retroactive application.62
However, in dicta, the Fetterly majority observed that the
ineffectiveness claim should have been known upon completion of
trial, and, therefore, was waived.61 Justice Bistline dissented from
the denial of rehearing, arguing:
The majority apparently does not realize that Fetterly's
counsel during his direct appeal and first petition was the
same attorney who Fetterly now claims was ineffective.
The majority cannot really expect Fetterly's former counsel
to have argued he was ineffective in the first petition. Such
a situation would be an obvious conflict of interest. 64
Not until 1993 did the Idaho Supreme Court bar a second
post-conviction petition under the new statute, refusing to reach
the merits of the claim. In Paz v. State,65 the petitioner attempted to
raise ineffective assistance of counsel in a second post-conviction
motion. 66 The court denied the petition by citing the "should
immediately be known" language from Rhoades.67 Once again

Justice Bistline, invoking "common sense," vigorously
dissented. 68 He traced the decisions in Rhoades and Fetterly and
decried the majority's new reasoning, which, he claimed "utterly
fails to explain the reason by which Paz could have alleged that his
trial counsel... was ineffective where Paz was represented by
[the same attorney] on both his [direct] appeal and his first
petition." 69

61. Id. at 1074.
62. Id. at 1074-75.
63. Id. at 1075 (dictum). In direct contrast, in Stuart II, the state supreme court reached
the merits of an identical claim which was presented to the court for the first time, without
ever discussing whether the claim should be subject to default, in a petition for rehearing in
the Idaho Supreme Court's review of a post-conviction petition. Stuart v. State, 801 P.2d
1283, 1284-85 (Idaho 1990).
64. See id. at 1080.
65. 852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993).
66. Id. at 1357.
67. See id. at 1356-57.
68. See id. at 1357 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 1358.
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The Idaho Supreme Court's failure to consistently apply the
principles of section 19-2719 in a series of cases decided after
the creation of this different procedural framework applicable in
capital cases not only undermined the legislature's intent in
attempting to expedite death penalty litigation, it also sent
inconsistent signals to counsel regarding the availability of postconviction process to capital defendants. The net effect of the
court's inconsistency was clearly to afford some capital
defendants additional process not intended by the legislature. In
failing to strictly apply the limitations on successive petitions
and time limits for filing incorporated in section 19-2719, the
court permitted some capital defendants additional process
likely quite favorable to them. However, it also permitted the
court to avoid construction of the statutory limitations in terms
that would have exposed certain weaknesses in the process
contemplated by those limitations. For instance, the court
avoided determining which claims might reasonably be said to
permit successive petitions for relief. It also avoided having to
immediately consider the reasonableness of the statute's
requirement that capital defendants assert ineffective assistance
claims within the 42-day time limit from the end of trial, a
period of time in which many potential ineffectiveness claims
might not be subject to full investigation, particularly when trial
counsel who might have rendered defective representation
continue to represent the defendant during that same time
period.
B. Constitutionalor ProceduralFlaws
in the Expedited Process
1. Idaho's Unitary System Does Not Provide a Fair
Opportunity to Litigate Important ConstitutionalRights
To sustain state default in federal court precluding federal
review, which is the ultimate goal of expedited statutes, there
must be some clearly defined method by which a criminal
defendant may reasonably seek state court review of his claims.70
70. See Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949).

EXPEDITED REVIEW OF CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION CLAIMS

99

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, "When no such method is
available to a criminal defendant, or he cannot reasonably
comply with the state procedural requirements, his
noncompliance with state procedures will not be an adequate bar
to habeas relief." 71 The court further explained that "failure to
follow state procedures will warrant withdrawal of a federal
remedy only if those procedures provided the habeas
7 2 petitioner
court."
state
in
relief
seek
to
opportunity
fair
a
with
Under this principle, even where state requirements are
facially constitutional, if, "in practice, those requirements
prevent [a] petitioner from obtaining review of his claims, state
process [is] ineffective and he [is] excused from complying with
it."73 When the Idaho Legislature passed section 19-2719, it was
understood that trial counsel would continue on the appeal and
would also handle the special post-conviction proceedings set
out in section 19-2719. 74 The 42-day period corresponds with the
time to file only the notice of appeal, which does not have to
include all the issues that will actually be raised on appeal. 75 The
Idaho Supreme Court also contemplated that the same counsel
would remain on the case throughout the appeal.76 The benefit of
retaining counsel on post-conviction between trial and appeal,
given their familiarity with the case and the issues for appeal, is
obvious in light of the 42-day statute of limitations, for only
counsel intimately familiar with the pre-trial, trial, and
sentencing proceedings could comply with such a short time
restriction. However, counsel at trial and sentencing cannot be
expected to recognize or raise their
77 own ineffectiveness because
of the obvious conflict of interest.
Most of the pre-1995 capital petitioners were represented in
the state courts on section 19-2719 direct appeal proceedings by
the same court-appointed lawyer who represented them at trial

71. See Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1992).
72. See id. at 1462.
73. See id. (citing Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir.1986)).
74. See 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 159, Minutes, Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee,

Feb. 27, 1984, at 2 (Senator Smyser stating that this "bill would have the defense attorney,
within the 42 days he now has, present all potential areas of appeal at the initial appeal.")

75. See IDAHO APP. R. 17(f).
76. See State v. Rhoades, 820 P.2d 665, 676 (Idaho 1991).
77. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986).
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and sentencing in the district court.78 Only four defendants, who
did not have the benefit of new counsel to inform them of their
right to pursue ineffectiveness claims and to assist in a postconviction application during the 42-day limit immediately
following sentencing, remain at risk.79 The inherent conflict of
interest obviously prevents trial counsel from evaluating their
own performance and accusing themselves of ineffectiveness.
Without the benefit of conflict-free counsel to assist in
identifying and raising claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the death row petitioner has been deprived of the
opportunity to "obtain a decision at all-much less a favorable
decision-on the merits of [his constitutional claims]." 80
2. Idaho Code § 19-2719 Is Not an Independent Rule
Precluding FederalReview
A rule is considered "independent" if it is not interwoven
with federal law or dependent upon a federal constitutional
ruling.8 ' "[T]he mere fact that a federal claimant failed to abide
by a state procedural rule does not, in and of itself, prevent
[review of] the federal claim: 'The state court must actually have
relied on the procedural8 2 bar as an independent basis for its
disposition of the case."'
For a state procedural rule to be independent, the state law
ground for decision must not be "interwoven with the federal
78. The petitioners were Charles Fain, Albert Ray Beam, Michael Scroggins, Donald

Fetterly, Karla Windsor, Bryan Lankford, Mark Lankford, David Card, Max Hoffman, Paul
Rhoades, and Timothy Dunlap.
79. Those defendants are Mark Lankford, Maxwell Hoffman, Paul Rhoades, and David

Card. Keith Wells was executed in an expedited voluntary procedure. See State v. Wells,
864 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Idaho 1993). Gerald Pizzuto and Charles Fain were permitted to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in federal court, despite the Idaho Supreme Court's
finding of a bar. See Pizzuto v. Arave, No. CV-92-0241-S-AAM, at 83 (D. Idaho June 24,
1996); Fain v. Arave, No. CV-93-0007-S-BLW, at 12-17 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 1998).
The remaining defendants obtained relief on other grounds and were sentenced to

life. See generally Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991); Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301
(9th Cir. 1993); Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. Ivey, 844 P.2d
706 (Idaho 1992); State v. Windsor, 716 P.2d 1182 (Idaho 1985); State v. Scroggins, 716
P.2d 1152 (Idaho 1985).

80. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394-95 n.6 (1985).
81. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985).
82. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1989) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985)).
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law." 3 Otherwise, the state court may fairly be said to have
examined the federal claim. A state law ground is so interwoven
if "the state has made application of the procedural bar depend
on an antecedent ruling on federal law [such as] the
determination of whether federal constitutional error has been
committed." "
Idaho Code section 19-2719 is applicable only to death
penalty cases and is thus unique in its application and focus. The
constitutionality of the statute and its enforcement necessarily
includes a recognition and incorporation of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this in
Beam III, clearly and unequivocally incorporating constitutional
concerns for non-arbitrary death sentences into concerns for
finality in death penalty proceedings. The court said:
The provision we are dealing with, [Idaho Code] § 192719(3), which specifically provides for challenges to a
sentence of death, is an absolutely fundamental and integral
part of chapter 27, title 19, Idaho Code. Without a
provision for challenging a sentence of death, a person who
has received a sentence of death might be denied due
process of law under the Constitution of the State of Idaho
and the United States Constitution. Furthermore, [Idaho
Code] § 19-2719(3) provides the finality required by the
United States Supreme Court in order for a person
sentenced to death in the state of Idaho to bring federal
habeas actions in the United States District Court. See
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115
L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991). The purposes served by [Idaho Code]
§ 19-2719(3) "ensure that death sentences are not carried
out so as to arbitrarily deprive a defendant of his [or her]
life." State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 960,
969 (1991) ... Because of the unique nature of the death
penalty, ... as well as the stringent constitutional
protections afforded to a person sentenced to death, we
hold that [Idaho Code] § 19-2719(3), which, in turn,
creates, defines, and regulates a primary right, is a

substantive rule."'

83. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); see also Harris,489 U.S. at
265 (applying Long to federal habeas cases).
84. Ake, 470 U.S. at 75.

85. See Beam v. State, 828 P.2d 891 (Idaho 1992) (emphasis added) ("Beam II').
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Construed in light of the mandatory review provisions of
section 19-2827,86 the Idaho Supreme Court's affirmance of a
death sentence necessarily includes not only a determination that
none of the claims raised have merit but also that the sentence is
not based on any arbitrary factor. Reviewing its application of
section 87
19-2719, the court concludes that the death sentence is
"valid." Thus, application of the procedural bar depends upon
an antecedent determination of federal law and does not'
constitute an independent and adequate state ground.
The federal questions that encompass the intent and
purpose of section 19-2719 deprive the statute of the required
"independence" of the state ground. Without that independence,
the state bar cannot deprive death row inmates of federal review.
3. Idaho Arguably Createsa Proceeding in Which Death Row
PetitionersAre ConstitutionallyGuaranteedCounsel at Idaho's
§ 19-2719 Proceedings
By its terms, Idaho's statute enacts a "special appellate
procedure" for capital cases, mandating that an appeal
"begin[s] to run when the death warrant is filed." 88 The death
warrant is filed either forty-two days after the judgment and
sentence is filed, "or in the event a post-conviction challenge to
the conviction or sentence is filed, [when] the order deciding
such post-conviction challenge is filed."8 9 If a defendant wants
to appeal from any post-conviction order, that order "must be
part of any appeal taken from the conviction or sentence. All
issues relating to the conviction, sentence and post-conviction
challenge [are] considered in the same appellate proceeding." 9°
An automatic stay of execution is in effect during the "special
appellateprocedures" and automatic review. 9'
Though called a "post-conviction" statute, section 19-2719
is a capital appellate procedure statute. It is designed and
86. In relevant part, IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(c)(1) (1997) reads: "With regard to the
sentence the court shall determine: (1) [wlhether the sentence of death was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor ......
87. IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (1997).
88. Id. § 19-2719(1) (emphasis added).
89. Id. § 19-2719(2).

90. Id. § 19-2719(6) (emphasis added).
91. Id. § 19-2719(12) (emphasis added).
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interpreted to serve "an integral and fundamental role in
challenges to the death penalty" and it "creates, defines, and
regulates a primary right."" Section 19-2719(3) "ensure[s] that
death sentences are not carried out so as to arbitrarily deprive a
defendant of his [or her] life." 93
While the United States Supreme Court has held in
Pennsylvaniav. Finley that there is no per se Sixth Amendment94
right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel,
section 19-2719 is dramatically different from the system of
collateral review at issue in Finley. In Finley, the court found
that there was no constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings to attack a conviction that "has long
since become final upon exhaustion of the appellate process." 9
The Court thus distinguished that situation from its holding in
Evitts v. Lucey, 96 in which it held that effective assistance of
counsel on appeal is guaranteed by the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The procedures established in sections 19-2719 and 194904 create a right to representation that is controlled by the
principles relied upon in Evitts, and that are markedly different
from the situation in Finley. For example, section 19-2719(6)
mandates that the appeal from the denial of relief "must be part
of any appeal taken from the conviction or sentence." In Evitts
the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right.
Although the Constitution does not require the states to permit
appeals as of right to criminal defendants seeking to review
alleged trial errors, 97 "[n]onetheless, if a State has created
appellate courts as 'an integral part of the... system for finally
adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,' the
procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the

92. See State v. Rhoades, 822 P.2d 960, 969 (Idaho 1991).

93. See State v. Beam, 766 P.2d 678 (Idaho 1988).
94. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).

95. Id. at 555.
96. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).

97. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
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demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution.""9 The Court observed:
Our cases dealing with the right to counsel-whether at
trial or on appeal-have often focused on the defendant's
need for an attorney to meet the adversary presentation of
the prosecutor. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 358, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963) (noting the
benefit of "counsel's examination into the record, research
of the law, and marshalling of arguments on [client's]
behalf."). Such cases emphasize the defendant's need for
counsel in order to obtain afavorable decision. The facts of
this case emphasize a different, albeit related, aspect of
counsel's role, that of expert professional whose assistance
is necessary in a legal system governed by complex rules
and procedures for the defendant to obtain a decision at
less a favorable decision-on the merits of the
all-much
case. 99
The capital appellate procedures established by section 192719, which include post-conviction challenges, entitle capital
petitioners to the effective assistance of counsel in that
proceeding under the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, the language of
the Idaho courts declaring that section 19-2719 "creates,
defines, and regulates a primary right" mirrors the language of
Evitts.' ° As noted above, in Coleman, the United States
Supreme Court recognized the possibility of an exception to the
general rule that there is no independent Sixth Amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel in post conviction
proceedings.'0 ' Idaho's capital post-conviction statutes create
that exception.
Idaho has elected to confer substantive rights on a capital
defendant in its unique appellate post-conviction challenge. It
must then also provide procedures attendant to those rightseffective assistance of counsel that comports with Due Process
and Equal Protection. Securing to a petitioner the right to
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel creates the need
for subsequent review, which necessarily fails to "expedite"
98. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)).
99. See id. at 394 n.6 (emphasis added).
100. See id.. at 393 (citation omitted).
101. See supra discussion accompanying note 32; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
725 (1991) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
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proceedings. The expedited post-conviction
undermines the express purpose of the rule.

statute,

thus,

4. Application of the 42-Day Statute in Idaho's CapitalPostConviction Petitions Denies the PetitionerEqual Protection and
Due Processof Law
The United States Supreme Court has held that the denial
of procedural rights to similarly situated persons violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' °2
Despite this principle, Idaho engages in disparate treatment by
operation of section 19-2719, which singles out capital
defendants sentenced to be executed. For these defendants,
Idaho has made it all but impossible to raise claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings.
Until 1995, indigent defendants sentenced to death were
automatically represented on post-conviction and appeal by trial
counsel. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that ineffective
assistance of counsel must be raised within the 42-day time
frame. Therefore, within the 42-day limit for filing a petition,
which is coincidentally the time for filing the notice of appeal,
the inmate has no other counsel to represent him.'o3 Non-capital
defendants are permitted to pursue their direct appeal and then
file a post-conviction petition after the appeal is final.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the statute does not
violate due process because
[a]ll that counsel is required to do is to organize all
challenges and issues that arose during trial and are
appropriate for appeal within 42 days. That is not an unduly
burdensome task. The statute provides adequate notice to
the defendant of exactly what is required of him, and
sufficient opportunity for all challenges to be heard. In
102. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730 (1972) (holding that differential
treatment for incompetent criminal defendants versus those civilly committed is violative

of equal protection); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 108 (1966) (holding that it is a
violation of equal protection not to permit jury trial or judicial determination of mental
illness for prison inmates as opposed to others being civilly committed);.
103. The Idaho Supreme Court has since issued a rule that appoints separate counsel for
the purpose of filing the post-conviction petition even though trial counsel may continue on
the direct appeal. See IDAHO CRIM. R. 44.2 (effective Aug. 8, 1995).
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addition, it serves the purpose of the legislature by
preventing the unnecessary delays that occur with so much
frequency in capital cases.
While the Idaho Supreme Court claims to find a rational
basis for the legislature's distinctive treatment of the two groups,
the court has not analyzed the drastic differential in the two time
periods. In essence, not only are capital defendants treated
unequally, the extent of the disparate treatment is overwhelming.
Coupled with the failure to appoint separate conflict-free
counsel, the statute violates both the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition, the court's description of the limited task of the
filing requirement is erroneous. The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that a defendant must review the record for ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims. This review is impossible,
first, because the trial transcripts are not even prepared until the
appeal is filed, and second, because the attorney responsible for
identifying these claims is trial counsel, a person who is unlikely
to recognize the ineffectiveness of his or her own representation.
Additionally, counsel is unlikely to raise such a claim because of
his own self-preservation interests. '°5
In contrast, trial counsel may file his client's notice of
appeal, which is due within the same time frame, without
identifying all issues that are to be raised on appeal. '°6 A rule
similar to the limitation in section 19-2719, in the context of the
direct appeal, would forbid raising any issue on direct appeal not
listed somewhere within the time to file the notice of appeal.
Idaho has no such rule, precisely because it would violate
established notions of due process and fundamental fairness. As
Justice Bistline noted in his dissent in State v. Paz,0 7 the 42-day
time limit
does not afford defendants anywhere near adequate time to

[find all appealable issues]. The statute's time limit is yet
another enhancement of the risk that an arbitrary and
capricious decision to impose the death penalty will be
104. See State v. Rhoades, 820 P.2d 665, 676 (Idaho 1991).

105. See, e.g., Robinson v. Norris, 60 F.3d 457, 459-60 (8th Cir. 1995); Ciak v. United
States, 59 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1995).
106. IDAHO APP. R. 17(f).
107. 798 P.2d 1, 22 (Idaho 1990) (Bistline, J., concurring and dissenting).
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made and carried out. As such, the time limit violates the
eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, °8 the Supreme Court identified
three general factors in the examination of due process:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.' °9
Here, the private interest is the greatest in our system of
justice: the defendant's life. The risk of erroneous deprivation is
great because the defendant will be barred forever from seeking
relief from a sentence of death based on at least one type of
claim, that of ineffective assistance of counsel. Against this risk
must be examined the interest of the state in limiting such
petitions to claims known within 42 days. That interest is
obviously limited. The direct appeal in capital cases often takes
years. Requiring the filing of the post-conviction claims within
this 42-day period has not shortened the length of time of the
appeal process or the review of capital cases. Indeed, the Idaho
Supreme Court has put in place a system of the appointment of
separate counsel that has effectively ended the 42-day rule,
except for those few people on death row who were not given
separate counsel after the enactment of section 19-2719 in 1984.
Thus, the government's interest has been minimized by the rulemaking power of the Idaho Supreme Court. To apply this law to
the few capital defendants caught in the failed experiment of the
legislative attempt to "rush to judgment" is the ultimate
violation of the principles of equal protection and due process.
Indeed, the opportunity for meaningful appellate review is one
of the hallmarks of the statutory death penalty schemes the
Supreme Court has found to be constitutional." 0
108. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
109. See id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
110. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984) (Stephens, J., concurring); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
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Idaho's brief time period for asserting post-conviction
claims is the shortest in the nation. In comparison, most states
permit such challenges after the appeal has been determined.
Even the new federal habeas law contemplates such filings after
the direct appeal, as the statute provides that the time during
which a properly filed post-conviction petition is considered
tolls the federal statute of limitations." '
Courts have acknowledged that some limitation for state
collateral relief might be too short, 12 and that some state
procedural rules may raise an insuperable barrier to vindication
of federal rights." 3 Idaho's 42-day rule is too short to comport
with the fundamental fairness required in capital cases.
Murray v. Giarratano14 held that there was no federal
constitutional right to counsel for indigent death-row inmates
seeking post-conviction relief. In contrast, in Idaho, the postconviction statute in effect in 1984 guaranteed the appointment
of counsel in all post-conviction cases, whether capital or noncapital."' Thus, notwithstanding that the federal constitution
does not require appointment of counsel, it is a violation of due
process for the state to establish an appointment requirement
with one statute and remove its applicability to capital cases in
another. 116

As the Idaho statute continues to wind its way through the
courts, with over fifteen years without a definitive ruling on the
constitutional adequacy of its expedited consolidated capital
case review, it can hardly be argued that the process has in any
way "improved" the state's capital system.
III. IMPACT OF EXPEDITED REVIEW ON CAPITAL
REVIEW PROCESS IN GENERAL

Jurisdictions other than Idaho have attempted to limit postconviction litigation. In one extreme example, the Arkansas
Supreme Court abolished its post-conviction remedy altogether in
111.
112.
113.
114.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Whiddon v. Dugger, 894 F.2d 1266, 1267 (11th Cir. 1990).
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 92 (1955).
492 U.S. 1 (1989).

115. IDAHO CODE § 19-4904 (subsequently amended in 1993).

116. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980).
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1989."17 Instead, the rule governing motions for new trial required
the trial court to ask about a defendant's desire to raise an
ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim, while also admonishing the
defendant that such a motion needed to be filed within thirty days
following pronouncement of judgment and sentence.118
The effect of the state supreme court's action was to
foreclose challenges to convictions obtained in state courts,
permitting defendants to seek relief from such convictions on
federal constitutional grounds by filing petitions for habeas corpus
relief in federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. One
consequence was that inmates obliged to present ineffectiveness
claims within thirty days of judgment were effectively denied
assistance of counsel at this step of the direct appeal process,
ultimately resulting in Sixth Amendment violations. Abolition of
post-conviction relief by rule also meant that Arkansas defendants
were freed from the additional burdens of exhaustion 20 and
deference to state court fact-finding' on those claims raised
initially in federal proceedings.
The court then reversed its position on state post-conviction
relief in another per curiam order, issued in 1990,122 in which it
reestablished

post-conviction

process

2

and

abolished

procedure for raising ineffective assistance claims
previously incorporated in the rule governing motions
trial.'24 The court explained its action:
[T]he primary reason for abolishing Rule 37 was
concern that post-conviction remedies were drawn

the

it had
for new
our
out

117. In re Abolishment of R. 37 and Revision of Ark. R. Crim. P. 36, 770 S.W.2d 148 (Ark.
1989) (Rule 37 had set forth the procedure for seeking post-conviction relief).
118. Id at 148 (revising ARK. R. CRIM. P. 36.4).
119. Robinson v. Norris, 60 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1995).
120. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (state prisoner's application for federal habeas
relief must be dismissed if it contains issues not previously raised on litigated in state
proceedings).
121. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (requiring federal habeas court to engage
in fact-finding on federal constitutional claims unless state courts have first afforded petition
full and fair hearing on claims). Townsend was subsequently overruled in part by Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (limiting the evidentiary hearing authority of federal
habeas courts and requiring deference to state fact-finding unless a fact-finding failure was
attributable to lack of fair process in state proceedings).
122. In re Post-Conviction Procedure, 797 S.W.2d 458 (Ark. 1990).
123. Id at 458; see ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1.
124. In re Post-ConvictionProcedure,797 S.W.2d at 458.
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extensively, and unnecessarily, before cases were
concluded. It was our thought to accelerate post-conviction
procedures and at the same time have a system which
protects the defendant's constitutional and fundamental
rights. Rule 36.4 was amended to provide a means by
which a convicted defendant could assert claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel within thirty days of
judgment. Rule 36.4 also provided a procedure to
consolidate the direct appeal of a judgment with the appeal
of the denial by the trial court of post-conviction relief.
(We would add that other states, such as Missouri, have
adopted a similar consolidated direct appeal/postconviction procedure in an attempt to expedite criminal
appeals and post-conviction procedures.) The scope of the
remedy afforded by Rule 36.4 was more limited than that
which had been afforded by Rule 37 .5
The court's explanation demonstrates its concern over
protracted post-conviction litigation, and its reinstatement of rule
37.1 as the vehicle for post-conviction relief includes a limitations
period designed to limit delay occasioned by post-conviction
litigation."' Yet the court also noted the need to ensure that
convicted
defendants retain a means of asserting constitutional
27
rights.1
The brief history of the Arkansas court's extreme reform of
post-trial process, including abolition of post-conviction
remedies, demonstrates the frustration evidenced by appellate
courts in dealing with protracted collateral challenges. But it
also reflects the need to ensure that "reform" does not
compromise procedural rights traditionally afforded convicted
defendants.

125. Id.
126. Id. The procedure is embodied in a modification of Rule 37 which, while it embraces
the scope of Rule 37, places some limitations on the remedy which were not formerly a part of
the rule; in particular, it reduces the time for filing a petition for post-conviction relief from
three years to ninety days where the defendant pleaded guilty or did not elect to appeal and to
sixty days where the defendant appealed.
127. Id.

EXPEDITED REVIEW OF CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION CLAIMS

A. State Experience with the Unitary Review Approach
Other states provide examples of different methods of
expediting the appeals process. In recent years, many states have
attempted to shorten the time period involved in their death
penalty appeals process by placing deadlines on filing appeals,
habeas petitions, and briefs, and on issuing court decisions. Thus
far, only a handful of death-penalty states have created systems
consolidating claims raised
128 by direct appeal and habeas corpus
in one court proceeding.
1.

Rejection of Unitary Review Systems

At least three states that have experimented with a unitary
review process have either (1) eventually abandoned that
approach after some period of experience, as in the case of
Missouri; or (2) suffered almost preemptive rejection by the
state's highest court in the initial round of challenge by
litigation. The Pennsylvania and Florida Supreme Courts moved
rather quickly to avoid many of the problems posed by
expedited review systems based on the Idaho model.
a. Missouri. The Missouri unitary appeal experience offers
perhaps as much insight into the undesirable qualities of the
consolidated appeals as does Idaho's continuing saga. Missouri
was one of the first states to adopt a special procedure for postconviction review.'29 The court adopted former rule 27.26,
patterned after federal law, in 1952; it provided a means for state
prisoners to challenge the validity of their conviction or
sentence. Rule 27.26 was adopted even though there was no
federal constitutional requirement that a state provide a means of
post-conviction review. 30 Effective January 1, 1988, Missouri
replaced rule 27.26, which had no time limits, and attempted to
expedite post-conviction review by establishing pre-appeal postconviction process in two new rules: rule 29.15 (relating to postconviction review of conviction after trial) and rule 24.035

128. See supra note 20.
129. Day v. State, 770 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
130. Williams v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1981).
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(relating to post-conviction review of convictions secured by a
guilty plea). 3 ' Rule 29.15 required that if an appeal was taken,
any motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a judgment or
sentence must be filed "within thirty days after the filing of the
transcript in the appeal." 132If no appeal was taken, the motion
had to be filed "within ninety days of the date the person is
delivered to the custody of the department of corrections." 33
'
Failure to file a motion within the time provided "constitute[s] a
complete114waiver of any right to proceed under this Rule

29.15."

In Day v. State,'35 the Missouri Supreme Court found that
the main reason for replacing rule 27.26 was to avoid delay and
prevent litigation of stale claims. "These [time] limits place an
increased responsibility on the movant, his counsel, and the
courts to promptly litigate claims." 136 These time limitations are
valid, reasonable, and mandatory. 17
Missouri attempted to avoid the pitfalls Idaho has met.
First, the Missouri rules were applicable to capital and noncapital cases alike,'38 avoiding the equal protection and due
process concerns raised by Idaho's capital-specific statute."
Second, the Missouri courts strictly construed the rules, leaving
little argument about inconsistent application." ° Third, the
Missouri courts made clear the rules were procedural, not
substantive. 141
Notwithstanding the improvements on Idaho's scheme,
rules 29.15 and 29.035 were nonetheless subject to criticism and

131.
132.
133.
134.

Mo. R. CRIM. P. 24.035, 29.15.
Id.
Id.
See Day, 770 S.W.2d at 694.

135. Id. at 693.
136. See Sloan v. State, 779 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (citing John M.
Morris, Postconviction Practice Under the "New 2Z26," 43 J. Mo. B. 435, 439 (1987))

(emphasis added).
137. Day, 770 S.W.2d at 695.
138. See MO. R. CRIM. P. 24.035(a), 29.15(a).
139. See supra Part II.B.4.

140. See Day, 770 S.W.2d at 695 (Mo. 1989).
141. See Schleeper v. State, 982 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Mo. 1998) (en banc), reh'g denied
(1999); State v. Reese, 920 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); Wiglesworth v. Wyrick,
531 S.W.2d 713, 722 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
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uncertainty. Dissenting from the majority's strict application of
rule 29.15 time limits, in Reuscher v. State, 42 Justice Thomas
emphasized the conflict of interest inherent in the time limits
imposed:
The primary fault for the untimeliness of the motion falls
upon Reuscher's trial attorney who also functioned as his
counsel for the direct appeal. His representation to
Reuscher that he was obtaining an extension to July 1, 1991
within which to file the transcript on appeal was
unequivocal and unconditional in form. Given this
representation and the attorney's knowledge that the date of
filing of the transcript is the critical factor in establishing
the due date for the Rule 29.15 motion, it was inexcusable
that the attorney did not immediately notify Reuscher that
he only received an extension until May 15, 1991.
Moreover, the attorney was at fault for failing to notify
Reuscher when the transcript was in fact filed on May 15,
1991.
The majority questions whether the attorney could
ethically honor a request by Reuscher to prepare his rule
29.15 motion. This is an acknowledgment that the trial
attorney has a potential conflict of interest with respect to a
rule 29.15 motion, which almost always raises issues of
incompetency of trial counsel and does so in this case.
Despite this well-known likely conflict of interest and the
fact that the date of the filing of the transcript is critical for
the timely filing of a rule 29.15 motion, this Court's rules
do not provide for notice to the defendant of the date of
filing. The majority is holding Reuscher to the unrealistic
standard that he should have foreseen the failure to notify
by his attorney and assumed that the transcript would be
filed earlier than he had been told.143
Interestingly, the dissenting justice noted
an additional benefit that would flow from this proposal.
This procedure should actually shorten, rather than
lengthen, the time period between conviction and the
carrying out of the sentence in the only cases it would

142. 887 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).

143. See id. at 592 (Thomas, J., dissenting; Price, J., concurring in dissent) (citation
omitted).
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apply to--cases where the timeliness of the Rule 29.15
motion is in issue. 44
Most telling of the difficulties raised by the pre-appeal
post-conviction process is the simple fact that the Missouri rule
was amended on January 1, 1996. It now provides for the filing
of all post-conviction motions "within ninety14 days
after the date
5
the mandate of the appellate court is issued."
b. Pennsylvania. In 1995, the Pennsylvania legislature
passed its Capital Unitary Review Act, which, like Idaho's
system, established a detailed procedure for the courts'
administration of capital cases, from the imposition of the
sentence of death to its execution.1 46 The statute established a
simultaneous, though bifurcated, post-trial review process at the
trial court level for post-sentence motions and collateral appeal
and a single appellate proceeding for the direct appeal and
collateral appeal. 147 In sustaining its suspension of the rule, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the legislation violated the
express mandate of Article V, Section 10 of the state
constitution by "directly conflicting with existing procedural
rules duly promulgated by" the court, noting that "the end
desired by the legislature-an expeditious process of review in
capital cases-will be achieved by the... 1995 amendments to
the [Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act]." 141
c. Florida. Florida's recently-enacted Death Penalty
Reform Act 149 declared the legislature's intent "to reduce delays

144. See id.
145. See Mo. R. CRIM. P. 29.15(b). In 1997, the General Assembly passed Missouri
Revised Statute section 547.360. It was approved by the governor on July 7, 1997, and
became effective August 28, 1997. Section 547.360 codified the language of amended
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15 almost verbatim. See Schleeper, 982 S.W.2d at 25354.
146. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9570-9579 (West 1998).
147. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9571(b), 9577(a) (suspended by Order of Aug. 11,

1997); see also In re Suspension of Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d 676 (Pa. 1999)
(discussing court's continuing decision to suspend the act).
148. In re Suspension of Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d at 680; see 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9545(b) (retaining the sequential order of appeal and post-conviction, but
imposing a one-year statute of limitations following final judgment).
149. 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 00-3 (West).
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in capital cases and to ensure that all appeals and postconviction actions in capital cases are resolved within 5 years
after the date a sentence of death is imposed in the circuit
court." 50 This new legislation required trial judges to appoint
appellate counsel within fifteen days of the imposition of a death
sentence, unless the defendant declines such representation by
appointment, in which case the state will not provide postconviction counsel.' The court would appoint private counsel
only in the event that the state's "capital collateral regional
counsel" files a motion to withdraw from representation due to
conflict of interest or other good cause or otherwise informs the
court of that office's inability to comply with the requirements
of the statute.
The Death Penalty Reform Act barred post-conviction
actions unless they were initiated within 180 days after the
defendant filed a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence to
the Florida Supreme Court.'52 Such a post-conviction action must
have raised all constitutional claims, including claims arguing
ineffective assistance of counsel, allegations of innocence, or the
prosecution's withholding of evidence favorable to the
defendant.'53 Regardless of the date of sentencing, any
successive post-conviction action could only be maintained if
filed "within 90 days after the facts giving rise to the cause of
action were discovered or should have been discovered with the
exercise of due diligence." 14
On April 14, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court unanimously
struck down the legislature's overhaul of the appeals process for
death row inmates."' The state supreme court, like the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, found the legislation "an
unconstitutional encroachment on this Court's exclusive power
116
to 'adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts."'
Although the holding "is based on the separation of powers
150. Id. § 5 (substantially amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.055).
151. Id. § 6(1)(a).

152. Id. § 6(3)(a).
153. Id.
154. Id. § 6(5).

155. Allen v. Butterworth, Nos. SCO0-113, SC00154, SCO0410, 2000 WL 381484 (Fla.
Apr. 14, 2000).
156. Id. at *1 (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
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claim," the Florida court also found that the sections applying to
successive motions "violate due process and equal
protection." "' The court also, however, announced its intention
to adopt two new rules consistent with the "the Legislature's
express intent that a sentence of death 'be carried out in a manner
that is fair, just, and humane and that conforms to constitutional
requirements,' and that there 'be a prompt and efficient
administration of justice following any sentence of death."""8
2.

State Approval of Unitary Review

While Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Florida have rejected
unitary review systems, at least three other states experimenting
with this approach have continued to find it a viable alternative
to the traditional approach in which collateral proceedings
commence only after the conclusion of the direct appeal.
California,' Colorado,' 6° and Texas 16' have adopted unitary
systems and continue to operate within frameworks designed to
expedite the post-conviction process by having direct appeals
and collateral process overlap.
a. California. In one of the very few pre-AEDPA unitary
systems, the California Supreme Court presumes a state habeas
petition is timely filed if it is filed ninety days after the due date
of the reply brief or twenty-four months after appointment of
counsel. 62 Because courts generally appoint separate trial,
appellate, and post-conviction counsel, the ineffective assistance
of counsel issues inherent in Idaho's statute are not as egregious
in California, and they have thus not been sympathetically
received by the federal courts.'63 Recent amendments to the
157. Id.

158. Id. at *12 (citing 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 00-3, preamble, at 3, and proposing
amendments to FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.851 and 3.852).
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.6 (West 1999); ); CAL. S. CT. POLICIES REGARDING
CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENTS OF DEATH, Policy 3, Standards Governing Filing of
Habeas Corpus Petitions ; CAL. APP. R. 76.6.
160. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-12-201 to -210 (1999); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 32.2.
161. TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 11.071 (West Supp. 2000).
162. CAL. S. CT. POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENTS OF DEATH,
Policy 3, Standards Governing Filing of Habeas Corpus § 1-1.1.

163. See, e.g., Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996); Bonin v. Calderon, 77
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California act' 6 attempt to meet the guidelines of AEDPA's
Chapter 154 "opt-in" provisions, 65 1 but
66 the issue has not yet
courts.
the
by
determined
been finally
b. Colorado. Attempting to qualify for the shorter time
limits under AEDPA, in 1997 Colorado incorporated a unitary
review system into its death penalty appeals process. 67 Under
the Act, automatic review by the Colorado Supreme Court is
combined with all other appeals; if a defendant seeks direct
review and post-conviction appeal from a trial court decision,
the Colorado Supreme Court consolidates the issues. 168 The
supreme court gives priority to capital cases over all others,
except as otherwise required by the state constitution. 169 The
statute directs the court to adopt procedural rules for the unitary
appeal process."7 Accordingly, the Colorado unitary review
process includes tight time limits for pursuing post-conviction
review,"' requires that all post-conviction review motions be
filed within 150 days, and permits no more than three weeks for
the delivery of transcripts.1 2 Provisions are incorporated for the
appointment of appeal and post-conviction counsel other than
trial counsel.7 Ineffectiveness of counsel during post-conviction
review is not a basis for relief. 74 All proceedings must be
completed within two years after the date the death sentence is

F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1996).
164. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.6 (West 1999); CAL. APP. R. 39.50; CAL. APP. R.
76.6 (regarding attorney qualifications); CAL. S. CT. POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING
FROM JUDGMENTS OF DEATH, Policy 3, Standards Governing Filing of Habeas Corpus

Petitions § 2-1 (appointment of habeas counsel simultaneously with appellate counsel.)
165. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2265 (West Supp. 1999).
166. In Ashmus v. Calderon,the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that California did
not meet AEDPA requirements, but the Supreme Court ruled that the issue was not
properly before the courts and overturned the decision. See Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d
1199 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
167. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-12-201 to -210 (1999); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 32.2.
168.
169.
170.
171.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-207(2) (1999).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-101.5(1) (1999).
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-208 (1999).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-204 (1999).

172. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(3).
173. Id.
174. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-205(5) (1999).
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imposed, and no extensions are permitted. 75 No further postconviction review is available unless the defendant shows
cause. 17 A notice to appeal all post-conviction review decisions
of the trial
must be filed with the supreme court within five 1days
77
court's order on post-conviction review motions.
c. Texas. Though its number of executions is greater than
any other state, 178 Texas has also adopted a unitary appeal and
Texas now requires the court to
post-conviction system.'
appoint reasonably compensated, competent counsel for
indigents in the state habeas phase of criminal appeals. 8 ° Under
new rules of court promulgated to effectuate the statute's
directives, the convicting court is prohibited from appointing an
attorney who represented the defendant at trial or direct appeal
unless both the defendant and the attorney request the
appointment or the court finds good cause to make the
appointment.1' An application for writ of habeas corpus and any
amendments or supplements to the petition must be filed within
180 days of the appointment of counsel or within forty-five days
after the brief on direct appeal is filed."' An untimely or
subsequent petition cannot be considered on the merits until the
Court of Criminal Appeals rules that good cause exists for the
filing out of time.'83
Idaho's experience illustrates the reality of the new Florida
legislation and the current Colorado and Texas schemes-that
the unitary appellate systems are likely to lengthen the process
rather than shorten it. Beyond the additional time and cost, any
175. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-208(3) (1999).
176. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-209 (1999).
177. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(c)(1).
1999)
Penalty
Information
Center
(visited
Dec.
16,
178. Death
<http://www.essential.org/dpic/>. (Texas has executed a total of 199 people since 1976,
thirty-five of whom were executed in 1999).
179. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 11.071 (West Supp. 2000). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals upheld article 11.071 against a series of state and federal constitutional
challenges in Exparte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 218-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
180. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 11.071, § 2(f) (West Supp. 2000).
181. TEx. CRIM. APP. R. FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEYS AS COUNSEL UNDER ART.
11.071, § 2(D) (adopted by per curiam order of Aug. 2, 1999).
182. TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 11.071, § 4 (West Supp. 2000).
183. Id. § 4A(a).
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effort "to further expedite [appeals] is going to cause a litigation
train wreck down the road," as a frequent issue is the
ineffectiveness of defense counsel, an issue that M
could not be
raised if both appeals were handled simultaneously.'
B. FederalDecisions Reviewing State ProceduresDesigned to
"Opt-In" to Expedited FederalHabeas Review in Capital Cases
Other states have attempted to meet AEDPA guidelines and
to qualify for the stricter time limits on filing federal habeas
petitions by providing post-conviction counsel to indigents. As
an incentive to states that are interested in speeding up the
appeals process overall, AEDPA shortens the deadlines for
filing federal habeas petitions, and therefore also state petitions,
if a state implements a program to provide counsel to indigents
in state post-conviction proceedings. AEDPA allows six months,
instead of one year, for filing a federal habeas petition, and
allows up to an additional thirty days for "good cause." ' 85
AEDPA places further limits on the issues that may be raised,
and it imposes time
86 limits on the district and circuit courts for
making decisions.1
The final question is whether the states that have revised
and amended their statutory schemes, at some risk to the
constitutional review of the same, will ultimately benefit from
the promises made by AEDPA.'87 Though AEDPA does not
expressly promote the unitary system, its codification of the
same seemed to breathe new life into an otherwise rare statutory
scheme.' The Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital
Cases provisions under Title 28 of the United States Code
provide an expedited disposition of habeas cases in states that
"opt in" by complying with its provisions."' To opt in, a state
must establish procedures "for the appointment, compensation,

184. See Randolph Pendleton, Slowdown on Expediting Appeals, FLORIDA TIMESUNION, Dec. 2, 1999, at BI (quoting Bill White, Chief Assistant Public Defender in

Jacksonville, Fla.).
185. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2263 (West Supp. 1999).
186. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2264, 2266 (West Supp. 1999).

187. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2265 (West Supp. 1999).
188. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261, 2265 (West Supp. 1999).
189. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2261(a) (West Supp. 1999).
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and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent
counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by
indigent capital defendants."'90 Three and one-half years after

the effective date of the Act, there is no definitive finding that
any state has successfully "opted in." '9' Though some courts
have declined to address whether the various jurisdictions'
mechanisms for the "appointment, compensation, and payment
of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel" satisfy
the opt-in provisions of AEDPA," the early determinations were
all answered in the negative. 92 Even though AEDPA includes
unitary review in its opt-in provisions, it is unlikely that unitary
review systems with inherent conflict of counsel difficulties, not
adequately addressed by statute, will fare better.
IV. CONCLUSION

Idaho's efforts at expedited review under a unitary system
have failed. So too have Missouri's and California's. It is clear
from Idaho's difficulties, Missouri's retreat, and California's
lengthy processes that the unitary system is not likely to
expedite and may well create delay, unnecessary costs, and
unquestionably inadequate review.
In any event, an expedited state process is unnecessary.
Excessive delay has been significantly curtailed by substantive
amendments to federal habeas jurisdiction, procedural default
rules, and state executions.' 93 Expedited review undoubtedly

190. See id.; see also Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(summarizing Satcher v. Netherland, 944 F. Supp. 1222, 1238 (E.D. Va. 1996)).
191. See Ashmus v. Calderon, 523 U.S. 740 (1998); see also Bennett v. Angelone, 92
F.3d 1336, 1342-43 (4th Cir.) (declining to determine whether the procedures established
by Virginia for the appointment, compensation, and reasonable compensation for
competent counsel satisfy the "opt-in" requirements), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1002 (1996).
192. See, e.g., Williams v. French, 146 F.3d 203, 206 n.l (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that
North Carolina "does not maintain that it has satisfied the opt-in requirements of Chapter
154 such that those provisions of AEDPA apply"); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618
(4th Cir. 1998); Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199, rev'd, 523 U.S. 740 (1998); Death
Row Prisoners v. Ridge, 106 F.3d 35, 36 (3d Cir.1997) (concluding that Pennsylvania is
not an "opt-in" state for purposes of AEDPA and that therefore AEDPA's amendments to
Chapter 154 of Title 28 do not apply to habeas petitions in capital cases from
Pennsylvania).
193. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
1998 (Dec. 1999).
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jeopardizes the quality of decisions by requiring inadequate
preparation time by post-conviction counsel and by constraining
deliberation by appellate courts. Innocent persons may be
executed who might otherwise be saved by reasonable delay in
execution through newly-discovered evidence. 1" In light of
recent events in the State of Illinois in which thirteen persons on
death row were ultimately found to be innocent, international
concerns regarding the inhumane use of the death penalty in the
United States, and decreasing public support for the death
penalty, those entities supporting retention of the death penalty
as a viable criminal sanction ought to take heed and urge care
rather than haste in the review of death sentences. Fairness is in
the interest of the state as well as the individual. Expedited
review processes in state courts are unfair, likely leading to
unjust conclusions in at least some cases.

194. Innocent inmates spent an average of 7.5 years on death row. Death Penalty
Information Center, Innocence: Freed from Death Row (visited Mar. 9, 2000)
<http://www.essential.org/dpic/Innocentlist.html>.

